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Abstract. In Peer-to-Peer (P2P) multi-channel live 
streaming, helper peers with surplus bandwidth resources 
act as micro-servers to compensate the server deficiencies in 
balancing the resources between different channel overlays. 
With deployment of helper level between server and peers, 
optimizing the user/helper topology becomes a challenging 
task since applying well-known reciprocity-based choking 
algorithms is impossible due to the one-directional nature of 
video streaming from helpers to users. Because of selfish 
behavior of peers and lack of central authority among them, 
selection of helpers requires coordination. In this paper, we 
design a distributed online helper selection mechanism which 
is adaptable to supply and demand pattern of various video 
channels. Our solution for strategic peers’ exploitation from 
the shared resources of helpers is to guarantee the 
convergence to correlated equilibria (CE) among the helper 
selection strategies. Online convergence to the set of CE is 
achieved through the regret-tracking algorithm which tracks 
the equilibrium in the presence of stochastic dynamics of 
helpers’ bandwidth. The resulting CE can help us select 
proper cooperation policies. Simulation results demonstrate 
that our algorithm achieves good convergence, load 
distribution on helpers and sustainable streaming rates for 
peers. 
Keywords. Peer-to-Peer, Live Streaming, Helper Selection, 
Regret Tracking Algorithm, Correlated Equilibria 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the recent years, a large variety of multi-channel P2P 
streaming systems (like PPLive ; UUSee ; PPStream) with 
large users community have been successfully deployed 
which provide a wide range of high-quality video channels 
[1]. To guarantee high sustainable streaming rate for all 
users in all video channels in these systems is a 
challenging problem because of time-varying popularity of 
video channels and limited upload bandwidth of streaming 
servers. A well-known solution for this problem is utilizing 
the unused resources of so-called “helper” peers to 
alleviate the workload of streaming server and improve the 
quality of experience of end users [2][3]. On one hand, 
helpers act as micro-servers to compensate the deficiencies 
in upload bandwidth of server and decrease the resource-
imbalance among the video channels. On the other hand, 
helpers as new service access points provide video streams 
to their connected peers.  
With deployment of the intermediate helper level into 
the hierarchy of server and peers, new design questions 
arise that should be answered: “how should peers select the 
best helper considering the acceptable quality of service?” 
and “how should peers adaptively react to the changing 
available bandwidth of helpers?” The widely used solution 
for the peer selection problem in P2P systems is reciprocal 
peer choking (like tit-for-tat [4]) in which peers 
periodically replaces their worst neighbors with potential 
better ones. However, the reciprocity assumption is not 
valid in the helper selection problem because of one-
directional stream delivery from helper to peers which 
makes the reciprocity-based approaches impracticable. 
The problem of “helper selection” in a peer-assisted 
multi-channel P2P streaming system can be addressed by 
using either a centralized system-wide or distributed 
approach. The centralized approach is not applicable in the 
practical P2P streaming systems due to significant 
communication overhead and cooperative nature of 
solution in which peers should obey the decisions made by 
the central controller. On the other hand, distributed 
approach has low implementation complexity and low 
communication overhead and helper selection algorithms 
are implemented at the user side. It is also more adapted to 
the autonomous environments where peers make 
independent (and selfish) choice of the best helper node to 
connect to.  
One of the driving features of peer-to-peer systems for 
adaptive learning algorithms is that these systems must 
operate in the changing conditions [5].  For example, 
utilities of peers in the P2P system may vary due to 
changes in streaming demands and helper upload 
bandwidth or join/leave of peers. It is therefore critical that 
peers detect and adapt to such events during their presence 
in the system. Given the non-stationarity induced by time 
varying upload bandwidth of helpers [6], the peers would 
incur connection costs in the form of degradation in the 
received streaming rate. The decentralized coordination of 
the helper selection would then require an adaptive 
procedure capable of both convergence to and tracking 
strategic equilibria as the environment changes.  
To this end, we deploy the game-theoretic learning 
algorithm of regret-tracking [7][8], a stochastic-
approximation-based re-expression of the well-known 
“regret-matching” algorithm [9][10], to guarantee the 
emergence and active tracking of correlated equilibria (CE) 
between the selection strategies of the peers. The game-
theoretic foundation of our proposed scheme also relieves 
it from the node cooperation assumption which has been 
taken for granted in the comparable schemes. More 
specifically, we consider a multi-channel P2P streaming 
system scenario with several helper nodes among which 
users want to connect to. We show that to adhere a pure 
Nash equilibrium (NE) can cause serious stability 
problems in the system and therefore, we investigate a new 
concept, correlated equilibrium (CE), which is a more 
generic solution compared to the NE and usually leads to 
better performance in terms of system efficiency. We then 
propose a distributed algorithm based on regret-tracking 
for the users to adjust their strategies to converge to a set 
of correlated equilibria in a distributed manner.  
Although concept of helpers has been addressed by a 
number of works [11][12][2][6][13][3], a fixed overlay 
topology was considered in most works and the user-helper 
topology was not optimized adaptively for improving 
system performance. The only related work is [14] which 
has proposed a solution for the problem of user-helper 
topology building. In this paper, authors propose a general 
optimization formulation for resource allocation in P2P 
streaming systems and then decompose the formulation to 
two separate optimization problem: storage/bandwidth 
allocation and topology-building optimization. A Markov 
approximation approach is applied to the overlay 
configuration problem and a distributed solution called 
“soft-worst-neighbor-choking” is proposed based on the 
optimal solution. The proposed algorithm cannot capture 
the inherent randomization in user join/leave behavior and 
stochastic dynamics of helpers’ available bandwidth. 
Our work differs with the existing work in that we 
develop an adaptive learning algorithm in which each peer 
adaptively deploy in a competitively optimal fashion given 
its limited information and orient the system converges to 
an equilibrium state in a distributed way. The proposed 
algorithm shows a good performance in terms of system 
efficiency and is especially adapted to the autonomous 
environments as P2P systems. We introduce cognition to 
the peers’ choking decisions to enable proactive adaptation 
even when the game is of incomplete information and the 
environment dynamics (i.e. helper bandwidth fluctuations) 
is unknown; our solution works within the confines of 
bounded rationality, a practical assumption consistent with 
the limited capabilities of the peer nodes. 
This paper is organized as follows. The theoretical 
background of work on game theory and no-regret learning 
are provided in the section 2. We then present our 
formulation for helper selection problem and discuss the 
details of regret-tracking algorithm for adaptive 
decentralized helper selection in Section 3. Section 4 is 
dedicated to the numerical analysis of proposed algorithm. 
We conclude the paper along with the presentation of some 
directions for future works.  
II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND  
Before presenting the proposed algorithm, we first 
provide a brief introduction on no-regret learning and 
regret tracking algorithm. Simply put, regret matching and 
regret tracking are procedures for learning correlated 
equilibrium strategies in a repeated game environment. 
Game players take actions, observe rewards, and adjust 
their strategies so as to guarantee convergence to a zero-
regret condition, in which no player would adjust his past 
strategy based on present information.  
Regret tracking is basically a stochastic approximation-
based re-expression of the boundedly rational regret-
matching algorithm, and is particularly suited for learning 
equilibria in slowly time-varying environments without 
Bayesian assumptions on the initial beliefs formed over the 
possible strategies of the opponents and states. While in 
the regret matching approach, the decisions of each player 
are based on the (uniform) average history of all past 
observed utilities, this choice is not desirable in our setting 
since the upload bandwidth state of helpers and thus the 
achieved streaming capacity evolve over time. 
Regret-tracking algorithm is completely self-centered; 
players do not require any information about each others’ 
actions or payoffs, and perform no explicit opponent 
modeling. Indeed, players need not even know of each 
others’ existence. Therefore, these properties make it 
suitable for peer-to-peer applications. The cost of 
rendering the algorithm adaptive is correspondingly 
weaker convergence. Since convergence is to a correlated 
(as opposed to a Nash) equilibrium, it seems that there is a 
cooperative element to the algorithm, even though peers 
act solely on their own rewards. 
The key to a regret-tracking-based strategy for a node 
is the way in which the past performance of its choices is 
assessed. Unlike regret matching, where all previous stages 
matter equally, here a node values more recent events 
higher than more distant events and regards the associated 
foregone utilities as less relevant. The ability to gradually 
let go of the past helps a node to better cope with time-
varying environments. This is while incorporating all past 
events indiscriminately makes the strategy so rigid that 
eventually in response to changing conditions, a node 
would have no recourse but to forget all the past and start 
anew, with an empty history, rather than to maintain the 
original strategy. In order to track a non-stationary 
environment, regret tracking uses an exponentially, 
recency-weighted averaging scheme [15] which decreases 
the weight given to a perceived utility as the number of 
intervening utilities increases. The cost to be paid for such 
adaptability, however, is correspondingly weaker 
convergence in that the regret estimates never completely 
converge but continue to vary in response to the most 
recently experienced utilities. As a side note, it is worth 
mentioning that the aforementioned weighted averaging 
scheme can effectively be incorporated into regret-
matching by compactly re-expressing the algorithm as a 
stochastic update equation with a constant step-size 
parameter [7][8], which will also allow for more efficient 
recursive implementation; here, we forfeit this compact re-
expression and instead adhere to the original regret-
matching-style description for the sake of clarity. 
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION: DECENTRALIZED HELPER 
SELECTION 
We consider a helper selection scenario consisting of a 
P2P system with ܪ helper nodes and ܰ peers, in which 
each peer can choose the helper node to connect to. In such 
settings, the challenge for peers is to achieve maximum 
streaming capacity by selecting appropriate helper node. 
This scenario can be modeled as a non-cooperative game 
where players are the peers. Each player (peer) ݅ selects 
one helper among the available ones to maximize its utility 
function. We assume that the aggregate upload bandwidth 
of each helper is shared evenly among the peers 
connecting to it. In the following subsections, we present 
the helper selection game formulation and propose a 
distributed algorithm to achieve the equilibria of 
formulated game. 
A. System Model 
The repeated game for the helper selection problem can be 
described as follows. 
Players. On the course of a system-wide helper selection 
process, every local ensemble of peers that currently aim to 
select a helper form a set of strategic players provided that 
their sets of contact points (helper sets) intersect. The 
symbol ܰ ൌ ሼ1,2, … , |ܰ|ሽ denotes as representative set of 
such players. It worth mentioning that a peer in the helper 
selection game does not need to be explicitly aware of its 
fellow players; instead, it suffices to only infer its actually 
realized payoff at each stage.   
Actions. The action space ܣ௜ ൌ ሼ݄ଵ, ݄ଶ, … , ݄|ு|ሽ for every 
peer ݅ consists of all the helper nodes are available to 
choose from. We denote by ݔ௜௡ሺܽ௜ሻ the probability of node ݅ choosing ܽ௜ at time ݊, and let ߯௜ ؔ  Δሺܣ௜ሻ be the set of 
probability distributions over ܣ௜; i.e., 
߯௜ ؔ ൛ݔ௜หݔ௜ሺܽ௜ሻ߳ሾ0,1ሿ, ∑ ݔ௜ሺܽ௜ሻ௔೔ఢ஺೔ ൌ 1ൟ. The mixed 
strategy of peer ݅ will then be: ݔ௜௡ ൌ ሾݔ௜௡ሺܽ௜ሻሿ௔೔ఢ஺೔ ߳߯௜. 
Helper Selection Utility Function. The instantaneous 
utility of a peer ݅ at stage ݊ of the helper selection game is 
a random variable. Each peer can directly calculate its 
received payoff based on the acquired streaming rate. Let 
ݔ߳८ denote the joint helper selection decision. The peer ݅’s 
decision, ݔ௜ is based on maximizing the expected value of 
a utility function ݑ௜ሺݔሻ which reflects the upload 
bandwidth capacity of helper, the activity of other peers 
and the cost associated with connection to a given helper.  
The key feature that characterizes our study as a game 
is that these considerations vary with the number of other 
active peers. We show these interactions as follows: 
ݑ௜௡ ൌ ݎ௜௡ ൌ
ܥ௛ೕ௡
Մ௛ೕ௡
 
where ݎ௜௡ is the instantaneous streaming rate the peer ݅ 
receives from the connected helper, ܥ௛ೕ௡  is the upload 
bandwidth capacity of helper ௝݄ at time step ݊, and  Մ௛ೕ௡  is 
the number of active peers which are connected to the 
helper ௝݄ at time step ݊.  
Histories. A player’s information consists of his past own-
actions and perceived own-utilities. A private history of 
length ݊ for player ݅ is a collection 
݄௜௡ ൌ ሺܽ௜଴, ݑ௜଴, ܽ௜ଵ, ݑ௜ଵ, … , ܽ௜௡ିଵ, ݑ௜௡ିଵሻ߳ܪ௜௡ ؔ ሺܣ௜ ൈ Թሻ௡. 
Behavioral Strategies. A behavioral strategy for player ݅ 
at stage ݊ of the helper selection game is a mapping: 
߬̂௜௡: ܪ௜௡ ՜ ߯௜. By considering ߬̂௜ ൌ ሺ߬̂௜௡ሻ௡, the set of 
complete histories of the game after stage ݊ is: ܪ௡ ൌ
ሺ∏ ܣ௜௜ ൈ Թ|ே|ሻ௡.  
System-wide Objective. Given a behavioral strategy 
profile ߬̂, the utility of node in the infinite-horizon 
selection game is given by: limே՜ஶ sup ଵே ∑ ॱఛො ሾݑ௜௡ሿேିଵ௡ୀ଴ . 
Since we are interested in the expected helper selection 
game, we define its equilibria in terms of the strategy 
profile ࢞ ൌ ሺ࢞௜௡ሻ௡߳ ൈ௜ୀଵ|ே| ߯௜ . More specifically, ࢞ is a 
mixed correlated equilibrium of the expected helper 
selection game if and only if: 
׊݅ ߳ܰ, ∑ ࢞ሺܽ௜, ࢇି࢏ሻॱݑ௜ሺܽሻ௔ష೔ఢ஺೔ ൒ ∑ ࢞ሺܽ௜, ࢇି࢏ሻॱݑ௜ሺ ොܽ௜, ࢇି࢏ሻ௔ష೔ఢ஺೔ , ׊ ොܽ௜߳ܣ௜ (3−1) 
where ࢇି௜ denote ሺ ௝ܽሻ௝ఢேሼ௜ሽ.  
B. Helper Selection Through Regret Tracking 
In the non-cooperative helper selection game, utility 
function of peer ݅, ݑ௜, after connection to helper ௝݄ is a 
non-increasing function of number of peers connecting to 
the helper ௝݄, which resembles the structure of utility 
functions in class of potential games [16]. The immediate 
result is that the helper selection game possesses a NE. 
But, playing the strategy prescribed by NE can yield poor 
performance in some situations. For example, consider ݊ 
peers that should choose among two helpers with the same 
upload bandwidth. Assume that in the first iteration, all 
peers are connected to the helper ݄ଵ. In the next iteration, 
utility of connection to the helper ݄ଶ is higher than the 
helper ݄ଵ because of its lower congestion. Therefore, all 
peers switch to the helper ݄ଶ. But this simultaneous 
switching makes the helper ݄ଶ over-loaded and all peers 
will switch back to the helper ݄ଵ in the next iteration. The 
switching back and forth between helpers will result in 
frequent interruption in the streaming flow and poor 
quality of experience.  
Regret-tracking can be used to orient system to an 
equilibrium in decision-making scenarios under 
uncertainty. The uncertainty caused by stochastic 
dynamics is due to the evolution of some environmental 
state whose trajectory is not influenced by the players’ 
decisions. In this paper, we are interested in the set of 
correlated equilibria of the helper selection game given 
that the players can indirectly acquire a coordination signal 
through the realized payoffs, and this coordination can lead 
to higher performance than if each player was required to 
act in isolation (as required by NE). Moreover, the 
convexity of the set of correlated equilibria arguably 
allows for better fairness between the peers, which is also 
evidenced by our simulation experiments. In the 
subsequent section, we rely on a reinforcement procedure 
to learn the expected payoffs simultaneously with the 
correlated equilibrium strategies. 
Our adaptive heuristic, viz. “Regret-Tracking-based 
Helper Selection (RTHS)” learns the expected payoffs 
simultaneously with the CE strategies of the helper 
selection game. The symbols and definitions used in the 
algorithm are summarized in Table 1. 
Using RTHS, the long-run helper selection game 
proceeds as follows: 
• At stage  0, each peer ݅߳ܰ has a random initial 
action ܽ௜଴  and a zero regret value ௜ܳ଴.  
• At stage ݊, each peer ݅߳ܰ chooses an action 
ܽ௜௡ ൌ ܽ with a probability proportional to 
௜ܳ௡ିଵሺܾ, ܽሻ; i.e., the regret for not having played ܽ 
instead of ܾ. In other words, ௜ܳ௡ିଵሺܾ, ܽሻ denotes 
the increase, if any, in the (weighted) average 
payoff that would result if all past plays of action ܾ 
were replaced by action ܽ, and everything else 
remained unchanged. The peer ݅ then perceives a 
numerical value of its payoff ݑ௜௡, that depends on 
the actions of other players. 
• In the next stage, peer ݅ is required to update the 
estimate of its regret value ௜ܳ௡ିଵሺܽ௜, ܽି௜ሻ, ܽ௜߳ܣ௜. 
The game moves on the stage ݊ ൅ 1 and the 
process repeats.  
Note that in the description of RTHS algorithm, the 
direct calculation of ෡ܷ௡ሺݔି௜௡ ሻ for other (unplayed) actions ࢞ି௜௡  may not be possible in general. In the followings, we 
present a variant of RTHS algorithm which estimate the 
quantity of ෡ܷ௡ሺݔି௜௡ ሻ. 
TABLE I.  NOTATIONS 
Using RTHS, the nodes learn to play an equilibrium; 
i.e., after a given number of iterations, the strategy profile 
࢞௡ ൌ ൫࢞௜௡, … , ࢞|ே|௡ ൯߳∆ሺܣଵሻ ൈ … ൈ ∆ሺܣ௡ሻ converges 
weakly to the set of correlated equilibrium behavior of the 
underlying game in a completely decentralized manner. Of 
particular note is that since in RTHS a peer does not need 
to perfectly monitor the others’ actions, no particular 
synchronization mechanism is required between the 
participants. This relieves the algorithm from the exchange 
of signaling messages given that it only suffices to have an 
observation of the individual utilities per learning iteration. 
Algorithm 1. Regret-Tracking-based Helper Selection (RTHS)  
Initialization: 
ܳ௜଴ ؔ 0; ܽ௜଴ ؔ Initial random action peer ݅ drawn from 
ሼ݄ଵ, ݄ଶ, … , ݄|ு|ሽ with ݌௜଴ሺܽ௜ሻ ൌ ଵ|ு|; ݊ ؔ 1 
begin 
for ݊ ൌ 1,2, …, 
let ݆ ൌ ܽ௜௡ 
ݑ௜௡ሺ݆ሻ ൌ ݎ௜௡ 
for each ݇ ് ݆ 
ܳ௜௡ሺ݆, ݇ሻ ൌ ൥ ෡ܷ௡ሺ݇ሻ െ ෍ ߝሺ1 െ ߝሻ௡ିఛݑ௜ఛሺ݆ሻ
ఛஸ௡
൩
ା
 
݌௜௡ାଵሺ݇ሻ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߜሻ min ൜ 
1
ߤ ܳ௜
௡ሺ݆, ݇ሻ, 1݉௡ െ 1ൠ ൅
ߜ
݉௡ , ݇ ് ݆ 
݌௜௡ାଵሺ݆ሻ ൌ 1 െ ෍ ݌௜௡ାଵሺ݇ሻ
௝ஷ௞
 
݊ ؔ ݊ ൅ 1 
End 
 
The RTHS algorithm requires that both the selecting 
(unchoking) and not-selecting (choking) decisions made by 
peers be somehow evaluated at each stage of the game so 
as to be able to update the regret values associated with a 
peer’s sequence of decisions. The unavailability of the 
information necessary for evaluating the alternate actions 
calls for a zero-knowledge learning scheme with bandit (or 
opaque) feedbacks. More specifically, a peer may define a 
proxy regret measure [20] by using the utilities it has 
perceived thus far when it actually played the alternate 
actions over the previous stages of the game. The 
calculation of the (proxy) regret measure ௜ܳ௡ሺ݆, ݇ሻ would 
then require that the average ෡ܷ௡ሺ݇ሻ be estimated as 
follows: 
෡ܷ௡ሺ݇ሻ ൌ ∑ ߝሺ1 െ ߝሻ௡ିఛ ௣೔
ഓሺ௝ሻ
௣೔ഓሺ௞ሻ
ݑ௜ఛሺ݇ሻఛஸ௡  (3−2) 
and then the average regret will be estimated as 
follows: 
௜ܳ௡ሺ݆, ݇ሻ ൌ ൤∑ ߝሺ1 െ ߝሻ௡ିఛ ௣೔
ഓሺ௝ሻ
௣೔ഓሺ௞ሻ
ݑ௜ఛሺ݇ሻఛஸ௡ െ
∑ ߝሺ1 െ ߝሻ௡ିఛݑ௜ఛሺ݆ሻఛஸ௡ ቃ
ା
                    (3−3) 
In equation (3-2), ݌௜ఛdenotes the play probabilities at 
stage ߬; in effect, the proxy regret for not having played ݇ 
instead of ݆ measures the difference of the average utility 
over the stages when ݇ was actually used and the stages 
when was ݆ used. The term ௣೔ഓሺ௝ሻ௣೔ഓሺ௞ሻ normalizes the per-stage 
utilities so that the length of the respective stages would 
become comparable. Once again, our key modification to 
the estimation procedure discussed in [20] is to replace its 
simple (uniform) averaging basis by a weighted average to 
account for the time-varying randomness affecting the 
distribution of the perceived utilities. 
Since it will consume too much resource to compute 
the estimated average regret directly according to equation 
(3-3), we design a recursive method to compute the 
estimated average regret. For each peer ݅, we first define a 
matrix ௜ܶ௡ with the following entries: 
௜ܶ௡ሺ݆, ݇ሻ ൌ ∑ ௣೔
ഓሺ௝ሻ
௣೔ഓሺ௞ሻ
ݑ௜ఛሺݔ௡ሻఛஸ௡;௫೔೙ୀ௞ ,   ׊݆, ݇߳ܣ௜            (3−4) 
and then let the matrix evolve at the stage ݊ as follows: 
௜ܶ௡ ൌ ௜ܶ௡ିଵ ൅ ௨೔
೙ሺ௫೙ሻ
௣೔೙൫௫೔೙൯ ௜ܲ
௡ ൈ ݁௫೔೙   (3−5) 
where ݁௫ ൌ ሾ0 0 … 1 … 0ሿ with 1 in the ݔth position, 
and ௜ܲ௡ ൌ ሾ݌௜௡ሺ1ሻ ݌௜௡ሺ2ሻ …  ݌௜௡ሺ|ܪ|ሻሿ். Thus, the 
estimated average regret can be computed as follows: 
௜ܳ௡ሺ݆, ݇ሻ ൌ ߝ כ ሺ ௜ܶ௡ሺ݆, ݇ሻ െ ௜ܶ௡ሺ݆, ݆ሻሻା 
Utilizing the equations (3-5) and (3-6), a recursive 
version of Algorithm 1 called “Recursive Regret-Tracking 
Helper Selection (R2HS)” is presented in Algorithm 2. 
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS 
In this section, we validate the feasibility and 
effectiveness of proposed algorithm by designing 
simulation scenarios in a P2P multi-channel streaming 
system. The dynamic helper selections strategies of each 
peer rely completely on the peer’s local information, and 
therefore can be implemented in a fully distributed fashion.  
Symbol Definition 
݊ time step 
ܰ number of peer nodes 
ܪ number of helper nodes 
݌௜௡ peer ݅’s probabilistic mixed strategy at stage ݊ 
ܽ௜ peer ݅’s selected action at stage ݊ 
ݑ௜௡ instantaneous utility peer ݅ actually receives at stage ݊ ෡ܷ௡ estimated average utility for playing an alternate action 
ߝ constant step size, ߝ ߳ሾ0,1ሿ 
ߤ normalization constant 
ܳ௜௡ሺܽ, ܾሻ peer ݅’s regret for not having played ܽ instead of ܾ  
ܳ௜଴ arbitrary initial regret 
Algorithm 2. Recursive Regret-Tracking Helper Selection (R2HS) 
Algorithm 
Initialization: 
ܳ௜଴ ؔ 0; ܽ௜଴ ؔ Initial random action peer ݅ drawn from 
ሼ݄ଵ, ݄ଶ, … , ݄|ு|ሽ with ݌௜଴ሺܽ௜ሻ ൌ ଵ|ு|; ݊ ؔ 1 
begin 
for ݊ ൌ 1,2, …, 
for each peer ݅ 
use play probabilities to select the action ݆ ൌ ܽ௜௡ 
compute the instantaneous utility ݑ௜௡ሺ݆ሻ ൌ ݎ௜௡ 
for each peer ݅ 
for each ݇ ് ݆ 
use equation (3-5) to compute ௜ܶ௡ 
use equation (3-6) to compute ܳ௜௡ 
update play probabilities based as follows: 
݌௜௡ାଵሺ݇ሻ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߜሻ min ൜ 
1
ߤ ܳ௜
௡ሺ݆, ݇ሻ, 1݉௡ െ 1ൠ ൅
ߜ
݉௡ , ݇ ് ݆ 
݌௜௡ାଵሺ݆ሻ ൌ 1 െ ෍ ݌௜௡ାଵሺ݇ሻ
௝ஷ௞
 
݊ ؔ ݊ ൅ 1 
End 
For reference, we formulate the helper selection 
problem as a cooperative optimization problem based on 
the Markov Decision Process (MDP) framework. Then, 
performance evaluation is done in terms of system social 
welfare, server and helpers’ workload, individual peer’s 
utility, and the balance in load distribution on helper nodes. 
The available bandwidth of helper nodes in each time step 
switches between three levels ሾ700,800,900ሿ according to 
a slowly changing random process. 
A. Alternative approach: Centralized MDP 
 When the cooperative optimization is considered over 
the set of centralized policies, then the problem is in fact of 
a single controller (the streaming server) which has all the 
information. In this setting, the cooperative policy ݏሺܠ|ܡሻ 
is the probability that the server assigns the helpers 
ܠ ൌ ሺݔଵ, … , ݔேሻ to the peers if the current helpers’ states 
are given by the vector ܡ ൌ ሺݕଵ, … , ݕேሻ. We assume that 
the helper ݅ states can be modeled as an ergodic finite 
Markov chain ௜ܻሺݐሻ. The Markov chains ௜ܻሺݐሻ, ݅ ൌ1, … , |ܪ|, are assumed to be independent. Let ߨ௜ be the 
row vector of steady state probabilities of Markov chain 
௜ܻሺݐሻ; let ߨ௜ሺݕሻ be its entry corresponding to the state ݕ Ԗ ௜ܻ. We also denote by the ߨሺܠሻ the probability of state ܠ ൌ ሺݔଵ, … , ݔ|ு|ሻ. Since the Markov chains that describe 
the helper states are independent, ߨሺܠሻ ൌ ∏ ߨ௜ሺݔ௜ሻ|ு|௜ୀଵ . 
For a given ܡ૓܇ and ܠ૓܆, the global occupation 
measure, ߩ௦ሺܡ, ܠሻ, is defined as  
ߩ௦ሺܡ, ܠሻ ൌ ∏ ߨ௜ሺݕ௜ሻ|ு|௜ୀଵ ݏሺܠ|ܡሻ. 
For any given policy, ݏ, and the corresponding 
occupation measure,  ߩ௦ሺܡ, ܠሻ, we define the utility 
function of peer ݅ as follows: 
ܴ௜ሺݏሻ ൌ  ෍ ෍ ݑ௜ሺܡ, ܠሻߩ௦ሺܡ, ܠሻ
ܠ஫܆ܡ஫܇
 
where ݑ௜ is the instantaneous utility of peer ݅. To find 
the social welfare of peers, the common objective of 
cooperative optimization for any policy ݏ is defined as 
ܴሺݏሻ ൌ  ෍ ܴ௜ሺݏሻ
ே
௜ୀଵ
 
ݑሺܡ, ܠሻ ൌ ෍ ݑ௜ሺܡ, ܠሻ
ே
௜ୀଵ
 
The cooperative optimization problem is then 
formulated as follows: 
maxఘ ܴሺݏሻ ؔ ෍ ෍ ݑሺܡ, ܠሻߩ
௦ሺܡ, ܠሻ
ܠ஫܆ܡ஫܇
  
σ.τ.         ∑ ߩሺܠ஫܆ ܡ, ܠሻ ൌ  ߨሺܡሻ ൌ  ∏ ߨ௜ሺݕ௜ሻ|ு|௜ୀଵ  
෍ ෍ ߩሺܡ, ܠሻ
ܠ஫܆ܡ஫܇
ൌ 1 
ߩሺܡ, ܠሻ ൒ 0,    ׊ܠ૓܆, ׊ܡ૓܇. 
Figure 1 plots the evolution of regret value of worst 
player in a large-scale cooperative multi-channel P2P 
streaming. As seen, the regret value approaches to the zero, 
when the algorithm converges to the optimal solution.   
 
Fig. 1. Evolution of regret value of worst player in a large-scale 
scenario 
Now consider a small-scale case with ܰ ൌ 10 peers 
and |ܪ| ൌ 4 helpers to evaluate the distributed RTHS 
algorithm against the centralized MDP algorithm as 
benchmark. As shown in the Figure 2, RTHS algorithm 
converges to the near-the-optimal solution for the dynamic 
helper selection game. 
 
Fig. 2. The RTHS algorithm is a near-optimal algorithm in comparison 
with centralized MDP algorithm. 
One of the features of RTHS algorithm is to evenly 
balance workload of peers on the helper nodes. This 
feature, as shown in the Figure 3, proves the fairness of 
RTHS algorithm which means the resources of helper 
nodes are fairly distributed among the competing peer 
nodes. So, all peers will receive a near equal share from 
pool of helpers’ resources (Figure 4).  
 
Fig. 3. The RTHS algorithm evenly distribute loads on the helpers.  
 
Fig. 4. The upload bandwidth of helpers is evenly distributed among 
peers. 
Upload bandwidth provisioning through helpers 
decrease the workload on the streaming server. When the 
sum of peers’ streaming demands exceeds from sum of 
helpers’ provisioned bandwidth, the surplus requests are 
referred to the streaming server. The minimum bandwidth 
deficit of helpers is defined as the required amount of 
surplus bandwidth if the minimum upload bandwidth of all 
helpers is fully utilized. As shown in the Figure 5, the real 
server load is close to the minimum bandwidth deficit of 
helpers and therefore, helpers greatly decrease the load of 
streaming server.  
 
Fig. 5. The real server workload against the minimum bandwidth deficit 
of helpers.  
V. CONCLUSION  
In P2P live streaming systems, the unused surplus 
upload bandwidth of peers can be utilized to alleviate the 
server load and increase the number of peers viewing the 
live channels. The helping peers called helpers play the 
role of micro-servers to the peers by sharing their upload 
bandwidth. The association of peers to the helpers become 
a challenging problem due to the unidirectional connection 
of peers to the helpers make the well-known reciprocity-
based approaches (like tit-for-tat) unfeasible. In this paper, 
we formulate the helper selection problem as a non-
cooperative game and deploy an online decentralized 
online learning algorithm called RTHS based on regret-
tracking algorithm which converges to the set of CEs of 
helper selection game. The RTHS algorithm features in 
terms of quick convergence, even load distribution on the 
helpers and fair bandwidth allocation to the peers. It 
significantly reduces the server load and approaches to the 
optimal peer-helper association in comparison with the 
centralized MDP algorithm. The RTHS captures the 
stochastic dynamics in the helper upload bandwidth and 
adapts the selection decision of peers accordingly. In this 
work, we focused on a single channel system. Our future 
work is to extend the RTHS to the problem of joint 
bandwidth allocation in the helper level to the video 
channels and helper selection in the peer level.  
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